Abstract
Presidential authority in the realm of national security policy has increased since George Washington’s administration. The most noticeable expansion of America’s position in global hegemon followed the allied victory in World War II. Accompanying the rapid increase in the Executive Branch’s authority has been deference from the traditional constraints on the President’s power, namely Congress and public opinion. This paper seeks to answer the question of whether the Judicial Branch, specifically the Supreme Court, has acted overall to constrain or enable the expansion of presidential war powers. This question will be examined through a qualitative analysis of existing academic literature and Supreme Court opinions.
Recommended Citation
Liam Kerr, Gettysburg College
(2019)
"The Courts in National Security Policy,"
The Compass: Vol. 1:
Iss.
6, Article 2.
Available at:
https://scholarworks.arcadia.edu/thecompass/vol1/iss6/2