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'Populism': an empty signifier used to discredit the movement for social change
Steve McGiffen

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the words 'populism' and 'populist' first came into use in the late nineteenth century United States, as a description of the politics of the People's Party.¹ This initial phase of the term's use is one of the few times in its history when it has not been an empty or floating signifier, a term coined by Claude Levi-Strauss in 1950². In simple terms, this refers to a word, phrase or symbol which contains no intrinsic meaning, but to which a range of meanings may be attributed by different speakers.³

Examples include 'freedom', 'democracy', 'socialism', 'liberalism' and 'society'. Use of such words, terms or symbols is unobjectionable if all participants in a discourse either agree on a working definition, or recognise the terms' fluidity and attempt in the case of each participant in a discourse to clearly set out and defend their own definition. It is when they are used without such a definition, but where a shared or 'common sense' definition is assumed, that they become dangerous and potentially propagandistic.

Furthermore, very few people, the 19th Century People's Party⁴ being once again a rare exception, have defined themselves as 'populists', though in the US non-pejorative uses of the term persisted until the Second World War,⁵ while in England the punning term 'Poplarism' was applied to a revolt over local taxes and poverty in the largely working class London Borough of Poplar during the early 1920s⁶. Those described as populists by – usually hostile – commentators, do have something in common, in that they identify 'the people' as a force for good, acting against a corrupt elite. This is a flimsy basis for real, practical common ground, however. Whether there really is such common ground depends on a number of factors, the most important of which concerns the justice of the particular critique. It is, to take an example, demonstrably the case that popular concerns are increasingly subordinated to the interests of transnationals and other major corporations, while “discourses of corporate citizenship, corporate social responsibility, and sustainability” are, as S.B. Banerjee argues, simply “ideological movements that are intended to legitimize and consolidate the power of large corporations.”⁷ Equally, it is demonstrably not the case that immigration presents an existential threat to some putative essential culture of the population of the host nation. Giovanni Peri is expressing the scholarly consensus when he notes that “(i)migration has always been a formidable engine of economic and demographic growth for the United States”;⁸ a statement which could be applied to many other countries, and one which could also refer to culture in general. Research also suggests that the level of acculturation amongst immigrants – the degree to which they absorb elements of the host culture – especially from the second generation onwards – indicates that migrants themselves are far more vulnerable to the loss of cultural traditions and practices than are indigenous population groups. Alex Mesoudi speaks of “the often-rapid acculturation of migrants to local behaviour.”⁹ To summarise, left 'populists' are mobilising against real threats to their wellbeing, while those who support far right movements – whether seen as 'populist' or not - are failing to identify the real reasons for their discontent. In other words, only in the fantasies of members of the elite and those who accept their right to rule do right-wing 'populism' and left-wing popular movements have anything in common beyond the superficial.

The Gilets Jaunes, who come closest to realising the myth of left-right populist unity, belie this
confusion in their actual practice. As Kouvelakis notes, despite a clear nationalist perspective on the part of a significant minority of Gilets Jaunes, “it's striking that anti-immigrant demands as such are barely audible within the movement, by comparison with the emphasis put on 'justice' and the redistribution of wealth.”\(^\text{10}\) The movement of the Gilets Jaunes is bewildering to contemporary mainstream commentators, but would not have been so to Antonio Gramsci, who presented a usable analysis of such phenomena almost a century before this particular example emerged:

At a certain point in their historical lives, social groups become detached from their traditional parties. In other words, the traditional parties in that particular organizational form, with the particular men who constitute, represent, and lead them, are no longer recognized by their class (or fraction of a class) as its expression. When such crises occur, the immediate situation becomes delicate and dangerous, because the field is open for violent solutions, for the activities of unknown forces, represented by charismatic ‘men of destiny’. These situations of conflict between ‘represented and representatives’ reverberate out from the terrain of the parties (the party organizations properly speaking, the parliamentary-electoral field, newspaper organization) throughout the state organism, reinforcing the relative power of the bureaucracy (civil and military), of high finance, of the Church, and generally of all bodies relatively independent of the fluctuations of public opinion. How are they created in the first place? In every country the process is different, although the content is the same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony, which occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses (war, for example), or because huge masses (especially of peasants and petty-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, add up to a revolution. A ‘crisis of authority’ is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or crisis of the state as a whole.\(^\text{11}\)

It is this crisis of ruling class authority which the Gilet Jaunes have exposed. Such exposure is, as Gramsci admitted- and as a long-term prisoner of a Fascist state he knew what he was talking about - replete with dangers, but is equally replete with possibilities.

There are many commentators who differ from this type of view, seeing 'populism' as a by definition negative phenomenon, a species of reaction descended not from French revolutionary traditions but from Poujadisme and, further back, the Church and King mobs of 18th century England. Most come from the mainstream of politics or the media or academe, and their agenda seems to be to make any form of radical social or political change appear weak in its intellectual foundations and simplistic in its critique of liberal democracy. In this view, the destruction of democracy is the unifying goal of populist movements of left and right.\(^\text{12}\)

One of the few exceptions to this ironically elitist reaction to 'populism' is Margaret Canovan, who in a paper published in 1999 noted that “(p)opolists see themselves as true democrats, voicing popular grievances and opinions systematically ignored by governments, mainstream parties and the media.” Their “professed aim is to cash in democracy's promise of power to the people”. Populism's roots, Canovan argues, “lie not only in the social context that supplies the grievances of any particular movement, but are to be found in tensions at the heart of democracy.” She sees democracy as having
“two faces -- a 'redemptive' and a 'pragmatic' face” whose “coexistence is a constant spur to populist mobilization”. In short, “populism is a shadow cast by democracy itself.”  

In subjecting movements to which the term 'populist' has been applied to scrupulous analysis, Canovan does succeed in identifying a common thread which she characterises as a reaction to prevailing dogma, which may be left-liberal or neoliberal, for example. Thus, she argues, taking the example of economic policy, the meaning attributed to 'populism' “can have different contents depending on the establishment it is mobilizing against....populists in one country with a hegemonic commitment to high taxation to fund a generous welfare state may embrace an agenda of economic liberalism, while other populists elsewhere are reacting against a free market hegemony by demanding protectionism and more state provision.” She goes on to propose a taxonomy of seven distinct varieties of populism, three of which are types of agrarian populism, such as that exemplified by the above-mentioned late nineteenth century US People's Party. The other four she categorises as 'political populism': populist dictatorship, populist democracy, reactionary populism and 'politician's populism'. These categories aren't exclusive. They do of course overlap. Clearly our example of agrarian populism was also an example of 'political populism', while the effective absorption of the People's Party into the Democratic Party during the 1896 US presidential election, which split, demoralised and quickly destroyed the movement, may be seen as 'politician's populism'.

In arguing that democracy has “two faces”, Canovan concludes that it is “the inescapable tension between them that makes populism a perennial possibility.” The central tenets of populism as so defined become, therefore, lacking in any controversial content, for who can (openly) object to attempts to bring decision-making power closer to the people? As she further notes, examples of populism tend not to be seen “as phenomena that challenge our understanding of democracy, and democratic theorists who are committed to increased popular participation in politics pay little or no attention to populist attempts to mobilize the grass roots.” Just as over the decades demonstrators who see themselves as defending or advancing democracy in the United States have carried the Stars and Stripes in a clear statement that their country should live up to its democratic promise, so those labelled as 'populists' are often seeking, in Canovan's words, to “cash in democracy's promise of power to the people.”

The same can be said for the singing of the Marseillaise by the Gilets Jaunes, which connects them both to contemporary popular culture – it is often sung at football matches, as Stathis Kouvelakis, citing Sophie Wahnich, points out, and in a boisterous, joyful way, and is unifying, rather than divisive, lacking the class content and crass imperialism of, for example, God save the Queen – and to their country's revolutionary tradition. Wahnich's point is that its adoption by football crowds reinvented the Marseillaise in a way which “creates links between people, making each one feel stronger.”

To the extent that populism does indeed exhibit certain characteristics across the otherwise contrasting movements to which the label has been attached, these are purely spectacular, superficial or organisational, and no way justify the constant stress on such similarities, or the construction of narratives designed to discredit the concept. To give an example, Yascha Mounk, a professor at both Johns Hopkins and Harvard and the author of The People vs Democracy: Why our Freedom is in Danger and How to Save It, recently published an article in The Guardian arguing that 'populists', whom he sees as synonymous with 'extremists', present a threat to democracy. Throughout, he compounds 'far left' and 'far right' as equivalent 'threats to democracy', as when he argues that “(i)n France, a rapidly changing political landscape is providing new openings for both far left and far right”, without defining who, in his view, constitutes the 'far left', or (as usual) where the centre lies.
and who placed it there, or acknowledging that the ‘centre’ is protean, that it has, for example, moved well to the right since the 1970s. In addition, he offers no example of left-wing ‘extremists’, rendering his inclusion of the left along with the right in his taxonomy of dangerous extremists mere innuendo. It is true that those labelled ‘populists’ invariably target, though from very different directions, the existing power structure as well as the various ideas and practices which provide this power structure with its hegemonic ideology, the ‘common sense’ via which it attempts to incorporate other social classes or groups, and in the name of which it claims to speak.19 The problem with this definition of populism is that it tends to embrace any group which attempts, via mass mobilisation, to challenge the power elite, and in doing so the description has no real analytical content and becomes quite circular. Thus Marine Le Pen's Rassemblement National (RN) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon's La France Insoumise (LFI), become conflated, despite having polar opposite views on most subjects, not least immigration. The same could be said of Geert Wilders Party for Freedom (PVV) and the radical left Socialist Party (SP) in the Netherlands, or Trump and Sanders in the US. In this respect, the creation of ‘populism’ in its 21st century form, not the movement itself (or movements that are given that epithet) by its instigators and leaders, but by those who have attached the label to so many diverse forces, stands in a long tradition of attempting to make any attempt at radical change profoundly dangerous. This is what Marco D'Eramo, writing in the Italian left magazine MicroMega describes as “this anxious unanimity” from which emerges a “concept of populism....regarded as self-evident, as if we all know what is being referred to”.20

Cas Mudde, regarded as a leading analyst of populism, argues that while the term is difficult to define and therefore open to abuse, this does not mean that it should be avoided altogether, which he describes as “the lazy baby-bathwater solution. It assumes that populism is irrelevant, rather than not dominant.”21 In my experience, on the contrary, the term itself is a form of lazy shorthand which compounds diverse movements into one mass, ignoring the fact that right and left wing versions of 'populism' bear only the most superficial similarities. In common with many political ideas which do and have become ‘dominant’, this concept of ‘populism' has re-emerged because it provides those entrenched in power with a handy stick with which to bash their opponents, the idea that, whether they come from left or right, populists represent a form of extremism which seeks to challenge democracy by undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

Yet the challenge of what has been labelled ‘populism’ involves to a large extent not hostility to democracy, but rather a struggle over its nature, in which neither the mainstream nor the far right get at all close to a credible definition of the term, one which succeeds in achieving a definition at least as sound as that of Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg: “government of the people, by the people, for the people.”22 Representative democracy has been a sometimes honest - often not - attempt to actualise this idea. Yet it has an inherent problem, one to which most people are willing to turn a blind eye provided the system is delivering, both in terms of material wellbeing and with regard to a feeling of being, if not in control, at least in a position to influence, in however limited a way, political decision-making. The problem lies in the difficulty, within any recognisable framework of parliamentary democracy, of devising a system which is both fair and efficient. On the one hand, a plethora of parties competing under a system of proportional representation (PR), allows voters a real choice. In the Netherlands, for example, there are thirteen parties represented in the 150-seat Tweede Kamer, the main legislative chamber, which also includes two independent members. The political groups range from the radical left Socialist Party (SP), to the far right Party for Freedom (PVV), with centre-left, centre-right and those appealing to specialist interest groups – the Party for the Animals (PvdA), the Over-50s party, and two small Christian parties – in between.23
On the other hand, the problem with this system is that while you can increase the presence of your favoured party in parliament and potentially within a coalition government, the inevitability of never seeing it in sole control of government, as well as the fact that the 'national list' system means that this form of representation does not create a direct link between the voter and the person for whom he or she votes, can lead to disaffection. In addition, coalition talks are generally convoluted and can take a very long time to establish a government – the last election did not lead to a governmental coalition until 225 days of negotiations had been conducted – and offer little opportunity for popular input\textsuperscript{24}.

However, the first-past-the-post system such as is used in Britain and the United States scarcely offers a democratic solution to these problems. In the US the two parties have collaborated in devising and reinforcing a two-party system so rigid as to make it almost impossible for anyone from outside the Republican and Democratic parties to gain office, a situation which has prevailed since before the Civil War. Since the beginning of this century, the only 'independents' elected – and there have never been more than two at any one time – have caucused with the Democratic Party, and one of them, Bernie Sanders, famously ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in the last general election, losing narrowly to Hilary Clinton. The flaws in this supposedly democratic system are compounded by the persistence of the Electoral College in presidential contests. As the US government's own website admits, this was established "as a compromise between election of the President by a vote in Congress and election of the President by a popular vote of qualified citizens."\textsuperscript{25} In other words, setting aside for the moment that those so qualified included no women and only a tiny minority of African-Americans, the Electoral College was designed as a compromise between relative democracy and a distanced system powerfully reminiscent of the way the European Union is governed today. The popular vote would have given the US its first woman president. The Electoral College gave the country a man who has since shown that he is clearly unfit for high office.

There is, then, little to be said for the US two-party system, but at least the winner of any seat generally enjoys majority support in that seat. This is no longer the case in Britain, where a two party system has evolved into a multi-party system with no corresponding electoral reform. This leads to numerous MPs being elected who won no more than a plurality in their seats. As a result, in the Parliament elected in 2017, very close to half of the participating electorate were represented by someone for whom they did not vote.\textsuperscript{26} In many constituencies, however, the imbalance was far greater, with numerous candidates being elected with the support of only a minority of voters\textsuperscript{27}. In France, at the same time, in the presidential election Emmanuel Macron won just 24.1\% of the votes, while Marine Le Pen was just behind him with 21.3\%. Centre-right candidate François Fillon scored 20.01, with Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the radical left La France insoumise (LFI – ‘Rebellious France’) a whisker behind him on 19.58\%. In other words, three-quarters of those who voted in the first round did not want Macron as their president. Most of those who voted for him in Round 2, therefore, were not really voting in support of him at all, but against his opponent, the far right Le Pen. As in 2002, the only alternative to a candidate determined (as he is now demonstrating) to undermine France's welfare state was one determined to victimise some of the poorest sections of the population because of the colour of their skin and/or, their chosen form of worship.\textsuperscript{28}

To return, then, to the relationship between populism and democracy: the form which the struggle over democracy increasingly takes is, paradoxically, a conflict between a majoritarianism which ignores or downplays the rights of minorities, and an elitism which adopts the institutions of parliamentary democracy but hollows out their ability to embody and express real power. In times when people feel...
that in general they are increasingly prosperous and reasonably well-governed, this can go unnoticed, but when people feel that they are being poorly governed by politicians over whose decision-making they have no real control, their economic and other grievances can be compounded into a rejection of 'politics as usual'. This was the major reason for the pro-Brexit vote: people in England and Wales became increasingly aware that the structures of governance in the European Union are far from democratic, that they cannot remove or replace the European Commission, despite the considerable political power which that unelected bureaucracy wields, and that the system of qualified majority voting (QMV)\textsuperscript{29}, while making a potentially unworkably cumbersome 'union' of twenty-eight disparate countries more practical, also means that laws can be imposed on their country without the consent of its government or parliament. To argue, with Nathaniel Copsey, that the European Commission does not differ from the civil services of the member states – which are, as he points out, also unelected – is simply disingenuous.\textsuperscript{30} Its exclusive right of initiative is merely the most important of the range of powers conferred on it by the Treaty of Lisbon and its predecessors, powers not shared by national bureaucracies.\textsuperscript{31}

As the 'people' – or the peoples of the EU's member states – have no real influence over the make-up of the European Commission, it is, and is widely perceived to be, at odds with the modern concept that "government derives its legitimate authority from the people. No person has any right by birth (or any mandate from God) to rule over others."\textsuperscript{32} There is, however, a problem with this utopian vision of democracy. As Canovan argues, looked at pragmatically, "democracy is essentially a way of coping peacefully with conflicting interests and views under conditions of mass mobilization and mass communication. Its great virtue is that it is an alternative to civil war or repression. It involves some local variant of a highly contingent collection of institutions and practices (evolved out of the particular traditions of representative government that grew up in certain Western European countries and their overseas offshoots) that have found ways of making power relatively accountable, widening the range of interests incorporated into the political arena and binding more of the population into the political system. From this point of view, democracy means multiparty systems, free elections, pressure groups, lobbying and the rest of the elaborate battery of institutions and practices by which we distinguish democratic from other modern polities."\textsuperscript{33}

That is certainly the standard model of democracy, and in this we can see already the seeds of conflict with those who insist on maintaining a 'pure' 'Lincolnian' definition. Yet this would be neither excuse nor explanation for the debasement of democracy which we have seen since the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s. It is not some abstract failing of actually existing democracy when it is compared to the purist ideal that has led to disaffection, but the undermining of the at least partially democratic forms which entitle states – and the European Union – to define themselves as 'democratic'. It is the absolutely concrete undermining of popular control of – or, more realistically, influence over – governmental decision-making by, first of all, the unabashed elitism of European Union institutions, in particular the Commission, in its overturning of referendum results and its public haranguing of elected representatives of the people; and, secondly, the extent to which corporate lobbies have infiltrated and come to dominate the EU's decision-making and that of its member states, as well as those of other countries, including most importantly the United States. During this decade alone, for example, "just five oil and gas corporations (Shell, BP, Total, ExxonMobil and Chevron) and their fossil fuel lobby groups have spent at least a quarter of a billion euros buying influence at the heart of European decision-making\textsuperscript{34}. In the same period, a situation has intensified wherein "(m)ember states and national corporate lobbies have developed a symbiotic relationship whereby the national corporate interest has – wholly wrongly – become synonymous with
the national public interest as presented by the relevant government in EU fora. Extreme examples include the influence of the car industry on the German political establishment (and the negative impact of this on EU climate and emissions’ regulations); Spanish telecoms giant Telefónica, whose closeness to the Spanish Government ensured its demands were absorbed and promoted; the state-owned coal industry which leads the Polish Government to be such a climate pariah; and the City of London, which can count on the UK Government to back its demands for the lowest possible financial regulation.35 Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, in Washington, DC, “(c)orporations now spend about $2.6 billion a year on reported lobbying expenditures—more than $2bn we spend to fund the House ($1.18bn) and Senate ($860mn). It’s a gap that has been widening since corporate lobbying began to regularly exceed the combined House-Senate budget in the early 2000s.”36

Set against this is what D'Eramo describes as “(a)nxiety about the 'dangerous classes', fear of rebellion, despair at the disruption of the established order”, the same forces which have enabled the United States government and Big Capital to interfere in the domestic politics of numerous countries, most recently Venezuela and Bolivia. The ragbag of movements and parties classed as 'populist' may be divided into at least two camps: firstly, those, like the RN and the PVV, who seek to impose a majoritarian view of democracy which opposes the establishment of rights specific to minorities, as well as ignoring or downplaying vital aspects of democracy which do not involve the selection of representatives at the ballot box, matters such as freedom of expression and assembly, the right to a private life, and the need for a politically educated citizenry; and secondly those who wish to see their country live up to its promise of a democratic system which they have been told underpins their freedom by allowing them to decide who governs them and what they want to see that government do.

With this brief account I have tried to demonstrate that the pejorative way in which the term 'populism' is used in the mainstream media and by the politicians who feel threatened by it, has two broad functions: firstly, it has enabled them to compound two quite different political strands: that of right-wing, nationalistic, racist and xenophobic movements; and that composed of movements of the left which have sought to expose the increasingly undemocratic nature of the present European neoliberal hegemony, and those in the US which, though the 'world's only superpower' has a more eclectic ruling ideology, are equally undemocratic. It has been possible to identify a number of aspects of this hegemony which progressive forces within the Gilets Jaunes, as well as allegedly 'populist' political parties and movements of the left (the Dutch Socialists, 'Corbynism' within the Labour Party in Britain, Mélenchon's LFI, Podemos in Spain, the Sanders campaign in the US, etc) have pointed to as undermining the 'democratic promise' of their countries' constitutions, demanding a fairer system of taxation, one which closes tax loopholes for the rich; a fairer distribution of wealth; the reconstruction of public services; a breaking up of banks deemed 'too big to fail'; binding referenda; restrictions on lobbyists; an end to privatisation and the renationalization of public goods, including transport systems; increased accessibility of the legal system; the break-up of media monopolies. Other pressing issues, in particular climate change, are also given space, but I have selected the points which, if implemented, would lead to a real democratisation of society. These, or very similar demands, can be found in the programmes of numerous so-called 'far left' parties, as well as movements like the Gilets Jaunes and the Sanders campaign. They are well-thought out and reasonable. They are 'radical' only because we have been told for four decades that 'there is no alternative' to a neoliberalism which has hollowed out democracy. And the concept of a 'populism' which unites far right and far left, which is hostile to democracy, and which sows public disorder, is a mere device to discredit a newly combative progressivism and the promise of radical change which it offers.37
3 Chandler, Daniel (2017) Semiotics for Beginners available in full at http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem02a.html
6 A very brief account of Poplarism can be read on the website of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) at http://www.unionhistory.info/timeline/T1_Display.php?irn=100308&QueryPage=../AdvSearch.php
8 Peri, Giovanni “The Economic Benefits of Immigration” Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies, Fall 2013
10 This is clear if you look at the public profile of the Gilets Jaunes. The movement certainly contains far right elements, but the list of demands publicised following several meeting in different part of France is recognisably left social-democratic or even radically socialist. See Kouvelakis, Stathis “The French Insurgency – Political Economy of the Gilet Jaunes', New Left Review, 116/117
11 Gramsci, Antonio (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks (Lawrence and Wishart)
13 Canovan, Margaret (1999) “Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy” Political Studies, 217, Mar 99, 47/1
14 Canovan (1999)
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17 Mounk, Yascha (2018) The People vs Democracy: Why our Freedom is in Danger and How to Save It (Harvard UP)
18 Mounk, The People vs Democracy
21 Mudde, Cas, ‘How populism became the concept that defines our age’ Guardian, 22 Nov 2018
23 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal
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