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Dominique Austin

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# **Africanistan: An Afghanistan in France's Backyard?**

American Graduate School in Paris

Dominique Austin

## Abstract

Since the advent of the global War on Terror, we have seen the growth and spread of many transnational terrorist networks to which the United States, backed by other major powers, has sought to eradicate. For the US., the major enemy was the Taliban and now ISIS. For France, Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operates in North and West Africa, has had growing influence, especially in Mali, which recently faced a military coup and a civil war. In 2013, France launched a military operation in conjunction with the Malian government to topple AQIM forces in the north of the country. Despite the military success, the Al Qaeda group continues to be active and pose a serious threat to the region. In this context, the term “Africanistan” has been coined to create an analogy between the situation of Afghanistan under the Taliban and that of Africa more recently. This paper seeks to analyze what “Africanistan” means for France’s security in the context of rising global terrorism. Trans-Saharan states will be used as a case study in an analysis of French security issues as it relates to international migration stemming from AQIM. Expected findings are that “Africanistan” poses not only a security threat to France, in terms of international immigration, but a terrorist threat as well.

**Key words:** Global terrorism, security, Africanistan, international migration, transnational terrorism.

The emergence of the Global War on Terror following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States has changed how we see global security, with the US at the forefront.<sup>1</sup> The attacks ushered in a new era of foreign policy for the US and put a renewed focus on terrorism worldwide. With the help of several allies, the US has attempted to combat transnational terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and the Taliban first in Afghanistan and then later in Iraq. The rise of numerous transnational terrorist organizations has raised questions about the security of states in a globalized world where borders can often be porous. In recent years, immigration has become a more contentious issue because of the supposed links between immigration and terrorism.<sup>2</sup> Most recently, US President Donald Trump's travel ban (which focused on six Muslim majority countries), and issues over immigration and refugee policy in Europe sparked by the refugee crisis started by the Syrian Civil War, have caused much debate about the links between security, terrorism, and immigration.

The Middle East has been at the center of the Global War on Terror. However, the spread of Islamist terrorism in Africa requires attention as well. Al Qaeda has many branches, one of them being Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operates mainly in Algeria, Mali, Tunisia, Niger, Libya, and Mauritania.<sup>3</sup> The aims of AQIM are dismantling regional governments and spreading sharia law where it operates.<sup>4</sup>

"Africanistan" is a term that denotes the rising security threat in the Sahara-Sahel region caused by a power vacuum similar to that created in Afghanistan by Soviet and then American invasions. It is meant to show a grave similarity between Afghanistan after the Taliban insurgency and the Sahel after Islamist insurgency, including factors such as drug and human trafficking, political turbulence, proliferation of weapons, suicide attacks and car bombings, as well as insurgency attacks.<sup>5</sup> The instability caused by this power vacuum has allowed terrorist groups such as AQIM, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin' (JNIM), and The Movement For Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) to thrive in the Sahel. AQIM seeks to eradicate what it sees as a continued Western

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<sup>1</sup> Barry Buzan, "Will the Global War on Terror Be the New Cold War?," *International Affairs* 82, No. 6 (November 2006).

<sup>2</sup> Valsamis Mitsilegas, "Immigration Control in the Era of Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, and Strengthening the State," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 19, No. 1 (Winter 2012).

<sup>3</sup> "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)," Counter Extremism Project, accessed August 1, 2017, <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim>.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> David J. Francis, *The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali*, (Oslo: NOREF, 2013).

presence in this region, specifically by France and Spain.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, AQIM’s growing influence in Africa has been cause for concern for Europe.

Scholars of the Africanistan literature are split into two camps, the first of which focuses on the security threat posed by having a highly volatile terrorist hub near one’s borders, and the second which focuses on the demographic issues pertaining to the mass migration caused by the terrorist presence. Consequently, this paper examines the implications of Africanistan and what it means for France in terms of security. This is especially pertinent today, when states are implementing restrictive immigration policies and target certain countries or groups because of the fear that their populations produce terrorists. In such situations, the security of the state is put above the security of individuals who are most likely fleeing persecution and violence from terrorist organizations. This paper seeks to analyze and explain the security implications of immigration trends from failed states.

### **Immigration and Security Post-Cold War/Securitization of Immigration**

After the start of the Global War on Terror, international terrorism came to be seen as a “common threat.”<sup>7</sup> The September 11 attacks brought forward some serious concerns about security in our new global order. Liberalism and globalization were suddenly cause for concern because of the way that terrorists and other ill-minded people could use them to their advantage. Thus, the relative success of the Global War on Terror came from the way that it tied together some long standing security concerns arising from the new liberal order.<sup>8</sup> Borders, one of the most important aspects that constitute a state, were seen as impenetrable as states have complete control over their borders and thus the right to deny entry to anyone it does not see fit. Globalization however, challenges this assumption by “questioning territorial borders and facilitating the movement of people [and goods] around the world.”<sup>9</sup> Borders have become more porous with people, ideas, and technologies being able to travel more easily among states. While this opening of state borders to trade, ideas, and peoples is generally to be promoted, such an opening also has a negative side wherein illiberal actors such as criminals and terrorists, “can take advantage of liberal openness in pursuit of illiberal ends.”<sup>10</sup> This has led to some anxiety concerning cross border movement of weapons, drugs, and peoples. Consequently, states have developed a securitized approach to immigration which “links migration

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<sup>6</sup> The New York Times, “An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” The New York Times, published July 1, 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?mcubz=3>.

<sup>7</sup> Buzan, “Will the Global War on Terror Be the New Cold War?,” 1104.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Mitsilegas, “Immigration Control in the Era of Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, and Strengthening the State,” 4.

<sup>10</sup> Buzan, “Will the Global War on Terror Be the New Cold War?,” 1104.

and movement to evils such as transnational organized crime and terrorism.”<sup>11</sup> It was these issues surrounding immigration that led to the creation of the first multilateral convention which sought to develop global legal norms against the threat of transnational organized crime: The United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime.<sup>12</sup>

In addition to creating concerns about the merits of globalization and the liberal world order, the Global War on Terror served to create a cultural narrative wherein the “West,” seen as the pinnacle of liberal democratic values, was in a war against Islam (presented here as the antithesis of liberal democratic values). Despite pushback from some Western leaders, this narrative has prevailed in many social and political discourses.<sup>13</sup> Here we see the infamous “clash of civilizations” theory being promoted in the conception of the Global War on Terror and terrorism in general. This theory has created a sense of fear concerning immigrants because it links culture and terrorism and consequently immigration and terrorism. The role of foreigners and foreign networks in the September 11 attacks, as well as in attacks in London and Madrid, served to strengthen the tie between immigration and security.<sup>14</sup> By tying immigration to ideas of security and law and order, governments have been able to implement more restrictive immigration policies in the name of national security.

This is a change from how security had been linked to immigration prior to the War on Terror. Security concerns about immigration post World War II were seen in a more traditional economic and cultural regard, and it wasn’t until after September 11 that security concerns about immigration became linked to physical and national security.<sup>15</sup>

Following the September 11 attacks, the US and the EU worked together to combat the threat of transnational terrorism, which they agreed needed a global collective to fight it. But despite collaboration in the field of counterterrorism, the EU and US have some differences. Though both make the fight against terrorism a priority, they diverge in their methods. The EU made sure to emphasize improving relations with countries in the developing world financially and tactically to stem the incidence of terrorism. This is in opposition to the US which tended to minimize this pathway and instead focus on carrying out a “tactical onslaught against the symptoms.”<sup>16</sup> The EU has also made sure to work with the United Nations more so than the US. Additionally, unlike the US, the

<sup>11</sup> Mitsilegas, “Immigration Control in the Era of Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, and Strengthening the State,” 5.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Buzan, “Will the Global War on Terror Be the New Cold War?”

<sup>14</sup> Marie Courtemanche and Gallya Lahav, “The Ideological Threats of Framing Threat on Immigration and Civil Liberties,” *Political Behavior* 34, No. 3 (September 2012).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 478-480.

<sup>16</sup> Jolyon Howorth, “European Security and Counterterrorism,” (Yale University, 2006), 6.

EU's counterterrorism initiative put much more emphasis on addressing the root issues of terrorism, using long term strategies.<sup>17</sup>

However, many scholars believe the link between immigration and security, and more specifically terrorism, is a weak one, which only serves to significantly increase the security apparatus of the state and hurt migrants and refugees. They argue that the relationship between terrorism and migration is a complex one that cannot be simply reduced to "all migrants are terrorists".<sup>18</sup> While it is true that terrorist organizations can and do use immigration as a way to infiltrate states, the majority of migrants are in fact fleeing terrorist violence.<sup>19</sup>

Philippe Errera of the French Foreign Ministry identifies three types of threat stemming from Islamist terrorism:

- 1) The core members of the Al Qaeda network and its trained associates;
- 2) Ethno-nationalist groups which share some of Al Qaeda's ideology but have primarily local or national goals;
- 3) "Freelance jihadists" [individuals or groups of individuals who should be considered "homegrown" terrorists].<sup>20</sup>

The last group is the one that poses an enormous problem at the moment, as many of the terrorist attacks that have recently been carried out in Europe have been by European nationals who were later radicalized. This group does not fall under the category of "immigrant" as many have been natural born citizens of their respective European countries of residence. This calls into question the validity of the securitization of migration and its effect on foreign and domestic policy of states.

### **Failed States and Terrorism**

Another security issue for states stems from the existence of failed and failing states, which are often hubs of terrorism that can easily have ramifications for neighboring and even far away states. The events of 9/11 only served to further strengthen the links made by academics and policy makers. Following 9/11, national security documents described failed states as "...safe havens for terrorists" and then US-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claimed that the greatest threat to American security was failed and failing states.<sup>21</sup> Failed states have two major challenges to their authority: their capacity to assert their authority over the entire domain of the state, and their ability to provide basic

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Alex P. Schmid, "Links Between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration," International Center for Counter-Terrorism (May 2016): 13.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>20</sup> Oldrich Bures, *EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?* (Surrey: Ashgate Press, 2011), 37.

<sup>21</sup> Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?," 469.

goods and services to its people. The first issue allows for violent conflict to brew within a state's borders and makes a country ripe for secessionist movements and civil wars. The second issue can lead to indigenous groups siding with non-state actors (i.e. terrorists) because these groups have the ability to provide what the state cannot or will not provide.<sup>22</sup>

Why is there such a preponderance of terrorist organizations in failed and weak states and what allows them to thrive? Firstly, failed and failing states can act as a host for terrorist networks which can take de facto control over territories within a state to use for training, shipment and transports of goods, or as a headquarters.<sup>23</sup> This was the case with Mali, where until French intervention, AQIM had taken over the whole northern half of the country. The Sahara became a transit for drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and human trafficking because the Malian government was unable to control all of its territory. Secondly, terrorist organizations have a bigger pool of recruits in failed states because the state is unable to adequately provide for its people in the way that is expected.<sup>24</sup> Consequently, these states have large populations which are struggling economically and socially, and which feel alienated by the state, which they see as corrupt. This large, disaffected population is easier to recruit and convince that violence against the state will address their grievances, or at least allow them to channel the frustration and anger they feel against their state.<sup>25</sup>

Some critics argue, however, that failed states are not the perfect hubs for terrorists, who prefer failing or weak states to those that have completely collapsed. Why are areas of state collapse not as attractive for terrorist groups as some scholars have argued?<sup>26</sup> A complete lack of infrastructure and governance actually makes it harder to terrorist groups to operate because they have no infrastructure on which to build their organizations. In addition, failed states usually have the attention of stronger states, which might intervene since the state has collapsed. This makes terrorist groups that congregate in failed states more susceptible to government intervention and thus annihilation (see the case of Mali). Weak states, on the other hand, have some semblance of governance, autonomy, and sovereignty which actually gives these terrorist groups some safety as stronger states do not have the ultimate authority to invade or intervene in functioning states (even if weak or failing).

The literature on failed and failing states and terrorism is somewhat divided over which types of states actually provide the perfect conditions for terrorist organizations to thrive. But there is

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 470.

<sup>23</sup> Nikolas Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh, "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, No. 3 (Summer 2002): 98.

<sup>24</sup> Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?," 469.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ken Menkhaus, "Quasi-states, Nation-Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 23, No. 2 (Fall 2003), <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/216/374>.



consensus that failed and failing states do indeed contribute to transnational terrorism on a level not matched by fully functioning states.<sup>27</sup>

### **An Afghanistan in France’s back yard**

The idea of an “Africanistan” has largely been shaped by the policies of former US President George W. Bush. The 9/11 attacks changed how Americans and the rest of the world envisioned safety and security in our globalized world. Suddenly, border security and the idea of “smart borders” came to the forefront of legislation, where it might have not been a priority beforehand.<sup>28</sup> In addition, immigration became an issue linked to the issues of border security and national security. The Bush administration’s idea to go to war against Afghanistan in the hopes of defeating the Taliban has been, and continues to be, an unsuccessful foreign policy objective. This policy, along with many others in the region, has allowed terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban to continue to cause instability. The failure of this invasion to curb terrorism, and the security problem it posed regionally and internationally, is a major point of comparison that the term Africanistan is trying to convey. Africanistan thus acts as a metaphor comparing the current day Sahel to Afghanistan post-invasion. The power vacuum left after the Soviet and American invasions allowed for the Taliban and then Al Qaeda to flourish in Afghanistan. A similar instability has allowed Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb to flourish in the Sahel. The rise of Salafism and implementation of sharia law, proliferation of drugs and arms, as well as kidnapping, are all cited as a basis for comparison between the two regions. But it is important to highlight that Africanistan is a metaphor for comparison and does not suggest that Afghanistan and the Sahel are identical; only that they have enough similarities to draw comparison.

The term “Africanistan” is not only limited to being a metaphor between Africa and Afghanistan. Africanistan can also be used to show the similarities between Iraq and Syria<sup>29</sup> as well as Libya.<sup>30</sup> All of these countries hold examples of failed US foreign policy against transnational terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS. Instead of destroying the terrorist groups and bringing peace and stability, these groups have continued to survive and found refuge among the local populations. The issues that arise from this phenomenon are destabilization of the area, mass migration, and border security.

<sup>27</sup> Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?,” 470.

<sup>28</sup> Mitsilegas, “Immigration Control in the Era of Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, and Strengthening the State.”

<sup>29</sup> Christopher S. Chivvis, *The French War on Al Qaeda in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

<sup>30</sup> Samuel Laurent, *Sahelistan* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2013).



Scholars of the Africanistan theory fall into two groups. The first focuses on the traditional security threats posed by terrorism. Laurent, Chivvis, and Barrera focus on the traditional security aspect of having a terrorist safe haven so close to France’s borders. It was the Libyan revolution which led to the instability in the Sahel. After the fall of Gaddafi, weapon and drug trafficking became prominent, and AQMI gained a large presence and power in the south, which spread throughout the rest of the region.<sup>31</sup> One of the indicators of a fragile state, as defined by the Fragile State Index, is the weakening of the security apparatus wherein the state and its role as the provider of security is undermined by the emergence of competing groups (rebels, military officers, terrorists, etc.).<sup>32</sup> The ability of AQIM to work with local populations adds more complexity to this issue. Al Qaeda has shown that it has the ability to ally itself with local populations, who often feel oppressed by the state and do not trust that their issues will be solved by state cooperation.<sup>33</sup> In Mali, Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb used the longstanding grievances of the Tuaregs during the Tuareg rebellion to gain control of Northern Mali. For scholars who focus on the traditional security threats posed by terrorism, Africanistan poses a major threat as it could potentially rival the Middle East as the center of global jihad.<sup>34</sup>

The second group focuses on the migration issues of Africanistan, citing the high number of unemployed youths of francophone origin as a reason for worry for France. Africa has, in addition to political turmoil, a large growing population with low levels of economic development as compared to Europe, thus increasing migration from Africa to Europe.<sup>35</sup> According to Michailof, “Sub-Saharan Africa is a powder keg”. The powder is demography and the detonator is the lack of employment (for many of these youths).”<sup>36</sup> Massive unemployment among youth was one of the principal explanations for the collapse of Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, along with the violence and political turmoil in these countries. Northern Nigeria and its Boko Haram insurgency are an example of this phenomenon as well. One of the main reasons Boko Haram was able to prosper was the high population density and low level of employment opportunities for youth. These issues, in addition to other economic factors, served to incite the northern part of the country and made it easier for Boko Haram to infiltrate it. Terrorism and the chaos that comes with it led to its spread to countries like Mali and Chad as well.

<sup>31</sup> Laurent, *Sahelistan*, 10.

<sup>32</sup> J. J. Mesner, ed., *Fragile States Index 2016 - Annual Report*, report, June 27, 2016, accessed August 20, 2017, <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2016/06/27/fragile-states-index-2016-annual-report/>.

<sup>33</sup> Christopher S. Chivvis, *The French War on Al Qaeda in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Hans Hoebeker, Hans Merket, and Minke Meijnders, “The EU as a Security Actor in Africa,” *Clingendael Monitor* (December 2015).

<sup>36</sup> Serge Michailof, *Africanistan: L’Afrique en crise va-t-elle se retrouver dans nos banlieues?* (Paris: Fayard, 2015), 8.

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101, boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris – France Tel: +33(0)1 47 20 00 94 – Fax: +33 (0)1 47 20 81 89 Website: [www.ags.edu](http://www.ags.edu) (Please cite this paper as the following: Dominique Austin (2018). Africanistan: An Afghanistan in France’s Backyard?. *The Journal of International Relations, Peace and Development Studies*. Volume 4.

Many of the countries of the Sahel plagued by terrorism and high unemployment are francophone. Political turmoil and overall instability can cause refugee flows, which pose particular problems to the states that receive them.<sup>37</sup> According to Michailof, many of the migrants are seeking to enter France, causing a demographic (and potential security) issue for the state. For all of the authors, intervention is key in stopping the proliferation of transnational terrorism and the results of not acting will be grave.

### **Methodology and Hypotheses**

This paper tests the theory that failed and failing states are more likely to host agents of transnational terrorism, as well as the counter-theory that failed states are less likely to host transnational terrorists and terrorist groups than failing states. In addition, this paper will test the theory that migrants from failed and failing states are not more likely to commit acts of terrorism than natural citizens of a country. There are two hypotheses that will be considered in this analysis: 1) failing and failed states are more likely to be the source of transnational terrorist attacks that target other countries and 2) migrants from failing or failed states are not more likely to be agents of terrorism than natural citizens of a country. This paper will choose to use Trans-Saharan states as a case study to test these hypotheses. The Africanistan theory implies that the Trans-Saharan states (which are all failing or failed), because of their political and demographic instability, are becoming hubs of terrorism, while the failed state theory links failed and failing states with a preponderance of terrorism. Thus, these two theories have been used to supplement each other in this analysis.

I utilize the Fragile State Index data from 2016 to analyze the strength of the two theories presented in the literature. The FSI creates a score for each state with higher scores signifying more instability and fragility while lower scores indicate more stability. The scores are composed using data from 12 key social, economic, and political factors which is then amalgamated to create the final score which can range between 12 (the lowest amount of risk) and 120 (the highest risk).<sup>38</sup> In addition to giving countries scores, they are also categorized by their level of strength or weakness. States with a score between 60 and 89.9 are considered to be at the warning level which itself has additional rankings based on intensity (elevated and high). Countries with a score between 90 and 120 are considered to be at the alert level again with additional rankings depending on variance of scores (high

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<sup>37</sup> Fiona B. Adamson, "Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security," *International Security* 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006).

<sup>38</sup> "Methodology," Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace, accessed July 31, 2017 <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/methodology/>.

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101, boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris – France Tel: +33(0)1 47 20 00 94 – Fax: +33 (0)1 47 20 81 89 Website: [www.ags.edu](http://www.ags.edu) (Please cite this paper as the following: Dominique Austin (2018). Africanistan: An Afghanistan in France’s Backyard?. *The Journal of International Relations, Peace and Development Studies*. Volume 4.

and very high). Countries with a score below 60 are considered to be stable or the highest level of the FSI which is sustainable.

Data from the Failed State Index will be coupled with data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which is a database that includes terrorist attacks around the world from 1970 to 2016. The GTD includes specific information on each attack including type of attack, the perpetrators, number of casualties, etc. The GTD has three criteria for determining a terrorist attack:

- 1) The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
- 2) There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
- 3) The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or noncombatants).<sup>39</sup>

Only terrorist attacks which meet all three criteria will be used in this analysis. Islamist terrorist attacks will be the type of terrorist attacks analyzed in this paper, either carried out by Islamist terrorist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda or ISIS who have their main base of operations or headquarters in Trans-Saharan states, or lone wolves.<sup>40</sup> The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is also utilized in this analysis. The GTI combines factors associated with terrorist attacks to show the preponderance of terrorism relative to other countries around the world. The GTI provides data on 163 countries covering 99.7% of the world's population.

Attacks from 2007 to 2017 will be analyzed in this study. Protocol questions will be made to better analyze and assert the claims of my initial hypothesis. Each question will be derived from the academic literature and focuses on issues that are necessary to discern the security implications of Africanistan for France. From the results gathered on the relation between immigration, failed or failing states, and terrorism, I will propose a foreign policy recommendation for France. The protocol questions for this study will be divided by subtopic and are as follows:

#### Status of migrant states

- How many Trans-Saharan (TS) states are ranked as warning on the FSI?
- How many TS states are ranked as alert on the FSI?

#### Immigration

- How many terrorist attacks have been carried out by migrants from TS states in France?

<sup>39</sup> "Data Collection Methodology," Global Terrorism Database, Accessed September 1, 2017 <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/>.

<sup>40</sup> \*AQIM, Algeria Province of the Islamic State, Ansar al-Dine, Ansar al-Sharia (Libya), Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia), Barqa Province of the Islamic State, Fezzan Province of the Islamic State, Islamic State of the Greater Sahara, Jund al-Khilafa, MUJAO, Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, and Tripoli Province of the Islamic State.

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Border security/terrorism

- How many Islamist terrorist attacks have been carried out in France in the 21st century?
- How many Islamist terrorist attacks have been carried out in France by TS state nationals?
- How many foreign fighters exist in France?
- How many terrorist attacks have been carried out in France by French citizens?

**African Migration to Europe: Data**

As has been previously shown, there is a causal link between the fragility of a state and terrorism. Many fragile states are overrun with social, economic, and political problems that allow for terrorism to manifest itself and counter the power of the state. The Sahara-Sahel region of Africa has been an area of concern regarding terrorism because of the many issues plaguing it. There are eight countries of the greater Sahara-Sahel region of Africa as defined by the OECD, including: Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Tunisia, and Libya. All of these countries are a part of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative created by the US to combat terrorism in Trans-Saharan Africa.<sup>41</sup> More importantly, all of these countries are developing countries and have different levels of fragility as defined by the Fragile State Index. Of the eight states, five (Libya, Mali, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger) are placed at the level of alert or higher, ranking between 95.2 and 110.1.<sup>42</sup> The remaining three countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) are marked as having an elevated warning, meaning they are close to being fragile or failed states with a range of 74.2 to 78.3 on the FSI.<sup>43</sup> When we look at the FSI decade trends, which pool data from 2007 to 2016, we see that all of the Trans-Saharan countries have been worsening, with only Morocco showing some marginal improvement (1.8 points). Despite this marginal improvement, when we look at the 12 individual factors that influence a country’s overall FSI score, we see that Morocco scores very highly (i.e. poorly) in the areas of group grievance, human rights and rule of law, and human flight and brain drain.<sup>44</sup> Chad and Algeria showed very low levels of worsening, moving down the FSI by 1.3 and 2.4 points respectively.<sup>45</sup> Tunisia, Mauritania, and Niger has showed an average worsening trend, moving down the scale by 9.0, 8.7, and 7.2 points respectively.<sup>46</sup> Libya and Mali, which both recently faced civil

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<sup>41</sup> “Borders in the Sahara-Sahel,” OECD, February 2015, <http://www.oecd.org/swac/maps/16-borders.pdf>.

<sup>42</sup> J. J. Mesner, ed., *Fragile States Index 2016 - Annual Report*, report, June 27, 2016, , accessed August 20, 2017, <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2016/06/27/fragile-states-index-2016-annual-report/>.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

wars as well as an expansion of terrorism, were ranked as critically worsening countries, moving down the scale by 27.1 and 19.7 points respectively.<sup>47</sup>

Table 1. Comparison of indices of 8 states scoring high on the FSI with the Terrorism Index

Country	2016 FSI Index	2016 Terrorism Index
Algeria	78.3	4.282
Morocco	74.2	.892
Tunisia	74.6	4.963
Chad	110.1	5.83
Mali	95.2	6.03
Niger	98.4	6.682
Libya	96.4	7.283
Mauritania	95.4	0.067

Source: Global Terrorism Index 2016; Fragile State Index 2016

A comparison of state weakness with severity of terrorism seems to show a positive relationship between the two variables. As the FSI index goes up, so does the preponderance of terrorism in most of the cases. Morocco and Mauritania are outliers with a terrorism index of .892 and 0.067 respectively despite their relatively high FSI score. In addition, the level of fragility has a positive correlation with a country’s terrorism index, with countries at the “alert” level having a relatively higher terrorism index (5.83 - 7.283) than warning level countries (4.282 - 4.963). It is important to note that Morocco and Mauritania are outliers. The average terrorism index of the eight countries presented here is 4.5.

What explains Morocco and Mauritania’s deviance from the general trend of failed states and a high preponderance of terrorism? Following the 2011 Marrakech bombing in which 17 people were killed and the Arab Spring, Morocco increased its already tight control over its domestic population and worked to strengthen its security apparatus. Furthermore, the country has “benefited from substantial European capacity-building assistance in operations and training” which has allowed for it to strengthen its counterterrorism measures and thus act as one of Europe’s key security partners in the

<sup>47</sup> J. J. Mesner, ed., *Fragile States Index 2016 - Annual Report*, report, June 27, 2016, , accessed August 20, 2017, <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2016/06/27/fragile-states-index-2016-annual-report/>.

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region.<sup>48</sup> Like Morocco, Mauritania, has worked extensively with the EU to strengthen counterterrorism measures after the Arab Spring. However, another, perhaps more important factor in Mauritania’s low terrorism index, is its importance in passive jihadism. Mauritania has a very strong appeal to jihadis because of its reputation for rigorous religious education and its perceived higher standard of authenticity.<sup>49</sup> Consequently, there have not been many terrorist attacks in the country as many jihadis have been radicalized there or have gone there for education.

Table 2. Comparison of indices of 8 states scoring low on the FSI with the Terrorism Index

Country	FSI Index 2016	Terrorism Index 2016
Finland	18.8	2.377
Iceland	22.8	0.25
Belgium	29.0	1.245
Italy	43.1	2.363
United Arab Emirates	44.5	0.422
Japan	35.1	2.447
UK	32.4	5.08
Poland	40.7	0

Source: Global Terrorism Index 2016; Fragile State Index 2016

Table 2. takes eight countries ranked stable or sustainable to analyze the relationship between strong countries and terrorism. Five countries were randomly chosen from the stable category and three from the sustainable category to mimic the pool of countries used in the comparison of weak states. Finland, Iceland, and Belgium are all sustainable states, while Italy, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, the UK, and Poland are stable countries. The correlation between the FSI index and the Terrorism Index is less strong among this pool of countries. The UK has a terrorism index of 5.08, well above the terrorism indices of the other stable and sustainable countries and more than double the terrorism index of Japan, the country with the next highest index. Poland and the UAE, which are among the lower ranked stable countries (though still with a very high FSI ranking), have the lowest

<sup>48</sup> Anthony Dworkin and Fatim-Zohra El Malki, “The Southern Front Line: EU Counterterrorism Cooperation with Tunisia and Morocco,” Policy Brief, *European Council on Foreign Relations* (2018).

<sup>49</sup> Geoff D. Porter, “The Renewed Jihadi Terror Threat to Mauritania,” *CTCSentinel* 11, no 7, (August 2018): 18.

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preponderance of terrorism, with Poland scoring a 0 on the Terrorism Index. With the exception of the UK, stronger states appear to have a lower preponderance of terrorism. What explains the UK’s high Terrorism Index? In the past two years, OECD countries have experienced increased terrorist activity.<sup>50</sup> The UK, Italy, and Belgium have all suffered multiple attacks with high casualties from ISIS, or ISIS inspired lone wolves. Thus, these countries, which did not have a high preponderance of terrorism beforehand, had a sudden uptick in attacks and casualties that has caused their relatively high Terrorism indices. The average terrorism index of the eight strong countries is 1.733. Despite some variance, the data from Tables 1. and 2. seem to support the first hypothesis: that failing and failed states have a higher preponderance of terrorism than strong states.

Table 3. Number of Migrants and Terrorists in France

Country	2016 FSI Score	Number of Migrants in France (2017)	# of Terrorist Attacks Carried Out in France
Algeria	78.3	1,450,00	1.5
Chad	110.1	<10,000	0
Libya	96.4	<10,000	0
Mali	95.2	80,000	0
Mauritania	95.4	20,000	0
Morocco	74.2	940,000	1
Niger	98.4	<10,000	0
Tunisia	74.6	390,000	2

Source: Global Terrorism Database 2016; Fragile State Index 2016; Pew Research Center 2018

Table 4. Number of Terrorist Incidents Made by French Citizens

Country	FSI Score	# of Foreign Fighters 2016	# of Terrorist Attacks Carried Out in France
France	34.5	1,700	9.5

Source: Richard Florida 2016; Fragile State Index 2016; Global Terrorism Database 2016

<sup>50</sup> “Global Terrorism Index 2016,” Institute for Economics & Peace (2016).

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Tables 3. and 4. Show how many times nationals of the eight Trans-Saharan countries in this study or French citizens participated in terrorist attacks in France. A mark was given each time a terrorist attack was carried out in France by someone of a certain nationality. The April 2017 Champs-Elysees attack which was carried out by 2 perpetrators (one of French and one of Algerian nationality) was counted as ½ a point towards each group. Table 3. shows the FSI index and the number of terrorist attacks carried out by nationals of each respective country. There were 3 terrorist attacks carried out whose nationality is unknown and who were thus, not included in the tables above. Out of all of the Trans-Saharan countries, attacks have been carried out by nationals of only three countries (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia). Furthermore, each of these countries have a lower FSI index compared to the other Trans-Saharan countries and are all ranked in the “warning” group (as opposed to “alert”). Algeria, which has the worst FSI index out of the three countries, had one attack carried out on French soil by an Algerian citizen. Morocco, despite marginally improving (it’s FSI index decreased by 1.8) had terrorist attacks committed in France by two of its nationals.<sup>51</sup>

Table 4. Shows the number of terrorist attacks carried out by French citizens, as well as the number of foreign fighters (citizens who go to Syria or Iraq to fight and train with ISIS). Despite France’s low FSI ranking, 9.5 terrorist attacks in France have been committed by French citizens in the past decade. Between 2007 and 2017 there have been 17<sup>52</sup> Islamist terrorist attacks carried out on French soil, all of which were carried out starting midway through the decade in 2012. From the data we see a growing trend of Islamist related terrorist attacks throughout the years, with 11.8% of the attacks happening in 2012 and 2013 combined, 11.8% being carried out in 2014, 35.3% carried out in 2015, 29.4% being carried out in 2016, and 11.7% being carried out in 2017. It is important to note that 2017 data is potentially incomplete as it goes only as far as August of that year. Thus, there is a possibility of more Islamist terrorist attacks happening in the year which would follow this positive growth trend. When we break down the data by nationality, we see that 4.5 attacks were carried out by foreigners (26.5%) all of whom were citizens of TS countries. 9.5 attacks carried out were by French citizens making up 55.9% of the attacks in the past decade. It is important to note however, that 7.5 of the 9.5 attacks were carried out by French citizens who were either second generation

<sup>51</sup> J.J. Mesner, *Fragile States Index 2016 - Annual Report*, June 27, 2016. Accessed August 20, 2017. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2016/06/27/fragile-states-index-2016-annual-report/>.

<sup>52</sup> Toulouse and Montauban shootings (2012), La Defense attack (2013), Tours Police Station Stabbing (2014), Dijon Vehicle Ramming (2014), Il-de-France attack (2015), Nice Jewish Community stabbing (2015), Villejuif Church attack (2015), Saint-Quentin-Fallavier attack (2015), Thalys Train attack (2015), Valence Vehicle ramming (2016), Paris Police Station stabbing (2016), Magnanville stabbing (2016), Bastille Day attack (2016), Normandy Church attack (2016), Champs-Elysees attack (2017), Second Champs-Elysees attack (2017).

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immigrants of TS or had TS origins. Three of the total attacks carried out were by those of unknown origins making up 17.7% of the overall attacks.

There are two important points that can be made from this data. The first is that over a quarter of Islamist terrorist attacks in France have been carried out by foreigners (from fragile countries as defined by the FSI). The second point is that French citizens also carried out more than half of all terrorist attacks committed in France and actually carried out twice as many attacks than foreigners. What does this tell us? Firstly, that the immigration (especially from fragile countries) does pose a security issue for France. In the past 5 years, France has faced a preponderance of terrorist attacks with a very high intensity (with over 1,000<sup>53</sup> casualties). Many of the assailants came to France on various types of visas (tourist, student, etc.) or were long-term immigrants to the country. The increase in people seeking to immigrate from the Global South to the North and specifically Europe, coupled with the increase in terrorist attacks, poses a serious threat to France’s national security. The second point is perhaps the most surprising: a high number (more than half) of terrorist attacks carried out in France were in fact by French citizens. This data supports the second hypothesis: that migrants from failed or failing states are not more likely to be agents of terrorism than natural citizens of a country.

What is interesting to note, however, is that the majority of attacks carried out by French citizens were by those of TS family origins (79%), usually a 2nd generation national. This means that these terrorists were French citizens but had ethnic origins in foreign countries (the majority of which were TS countries). Additionally, France is the European country with the second highest number of foreign fighters after Russia. Thus, not only are most of the assailants of terrorist attacks in France French citizens but they are (mostly) ethnic minorities as well. Additionally, many French citizens (of French ethnicity or foreign ethnicity) are traveling to Syria, Libya, and Iraq to train with Al Qaeda and ISIS. These are not migrants, but French citizens who spent most if not all of their life in France. This brings up the question of why so many French citizens are committing acts of terrorism in their own country and what role does their ethnic background play in this phenomenon?

## Conclusion

Failed and failing states are often believed to be hubs of terrorism and terrorist activity. Because of their lack of ability to assert their authority over their state and their lack of ability to

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<sup>53</sup> Global Terrorism Index 2013 – 2016.

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provide basic goods to their citizens, these states have more terrorist activity happening in their countries on average than stable states. The case study proved to be true in this assertion as on average the failed and failing states had a higher GTI, with the exception of Morocco and Mauritania. Despite these outliers, the 8 failing and failed states from the case study had on average a higher terrorism index than the 8 stable and sustainable states. The fear of neighboring countries is that these countries will, in the worst case, implode, and the ramifications of their instability will spread and be felt by these stronger countries. This was the case for Niger, which felt the ramifications of Boko Haram, a Nigerian based terrorist organization. Mali and Libya, which both recently had civil wars, also have a very high GTI and their political instability explains this. In fact, the Libyan Civil War and the toppling of Gaddafi accelerated the Malian Civil War by creating an influx of Islamist fighters into the country. Thus, in two cases we have states feeling the ramifications of a high level of terrorism in a neighboring country. Does this make France's fears valid? The majority of the countries studied are francophone and thus one could imagine not only a high number of refugees coming into the country but also terrorists sneaking into the country as immigrants or refugees. Menkhaus, argued that, in fact, failed states are not suitable for terrorist organizations because these states have complete lack of infrastructure and autonomy, which makes these groups more susceptible to the failures of the state as well as intervention from third parties. However, the data did not support this theory as the weak states (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) had the lowest levels of terrorism, all falling below 5 with Morocco in fact having a GTI of .892.

When we look at the number of Islamist terrorist attacks carried out by foreigners versus French (or European) citizens, French citizens have committed more than twice as many attacks in the past decade. However, when we compare these numbers (number of attacks carried out) to the number of migrants and number of French citizens in the country, migrants have a higher preponderance of committing terrorist attacks (as there is a much lower number of migrants in the country than citizens). Does international migration pose a security implication for states that are on the receiving end? Yes, more than a quarter of the Islamist terrorist attacks carried out in France in the past decade have been by migrants, with almost all being from the case study countries. However, the status of migrants should not be securitized to such an extent and over-sensationalized because they, in fact, carry out fewer attacks than French citizens. Furthermore, it is a very small percentage of migrants who actually carry out attacks: less than 1 per cent of the number of migrants from each TS country in the past decade. In France, the majority of attacks were in fact carried out by French

citizens. However, it is important to note that a majority of the French citizens who carried out attacks were of TS origins, meaning their parents or grandparents were from those countries or that their ethnicity is of that country. This aspect of the study adds more to the Africanistan literature, as these attackers are the children of migrants or children of foreign ethnic origins not fully integrating into French society.

What does this mean for France exactly? Is Africanistan a threat? From the research conducted, the Africanistan literature seems to be supported. However, it is important to note that, as of now, the sample size (total number of Islamist attacks) is relatively low (with only 17 attacks having been carried out between 2007 and 2017). As the Global War on Terror continues, there are bound to be more Islamist attacks carried out in France. Further research should be done in the near future in order to give more weight to the data collected. However, as of now, these numbers are of grave importance as policy makers scramble to understand the profiles of terrorists, which can have major domestic and foreign policy implications for not only France but the rest of Europe as well. Although one of the arguments in this study was that migrants do not have a higher preponderance of being terrorists than citizens, it was not meant deny the possible danger that migrants can pose in the era of global terrorism. While France needs to continue to vet its migrants however, it also needs to put more focus on how its own citizens are becoming radicalized in France or going to Syria and Iraq to fight for ISIS.

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*Dominique Austin is a recent graduate of the American Graduate School in Paris where she received her M.A in international relations & diplomacy with a focus on contemporary African politics. During her time there, she focused on immigration, national security, and terrorism. She has a particular interest in diplomatic relations between France and Francophone African countries. Dominique has presented her research at conferences at universities in Istanbul, Turkey and Paris, France.*